The Role of Source Preference and Subjective Probability in Valuing Expected Travel Time Savings by Hensher, David A. et al.
  
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 
ITLS-WP-14-15 
The Role of Source Preference and 
Subjective Probability in Valuing 
Expected Travel Time Savings  
 
By
 
David A. Hensher, Zheng Li and Chinh Ho 
 
 
August 2014 
 
ISSN 1832-570X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTE of TRANSPORT and 
LOGISTICS STUDIES 
The Australian Key Centre in 
Transport and Logistics Management 
 
The University of Sydney 
Established under the Australian Research Council’s Key Centre Program. 
 
NUMBER: Working Paper ITLS-WP-14-15 
TITLE: The Role of Source Preference and Subjective Probability in 
Valuing Expected Travel Time Savings  
ABSTRACT: This paper proposes a fully subjective approach to capture the impact of travel time variability on travel decision making that 
accommodates subjective probabilities and source preference, 
the latter construct referring to respondent preferences to make 
judgments on matters that they have reasonable if only vague 
beliefs about than on matched chance events. The methods of 
eliciting subjective probabilities and source preference are 
discussed together with a suggested way forward to introduce, 
and hence capture parametrically, attitudes towards uncertainty. 
Using a 2014 survey of commuters in Sydney, we provide 
examples of modelling source preference and the implications 
for valuing expected travel time savings. The paper highlights 
the limitations of stated choice experiments when subjective 
attribute levels and their occurrence are relevant, suggesting a 
return to a revised focus on revealed preference data. 
 
KEY WORDS: travel time variability, risk, uncertainty, subjective probability, uncertainty aversion, source preference, value of expected 
travel time savings 
AUTHORS: Hensher, Li and Ho 
Acknowledgements: This study has been supported by the Australian Research 
Council Discovery Program Grant DP120100201 titled: 
‘Valuation of Service Reliability and Crowding under Risk and 
Uncertainty: Neglected Drivers of Demand for Public 
Transport’.  
 
CONTACT: INSTITUTE OF TRANSPORT AND LOGISTICS STUDIES 
(C13) 
The Australian Key Centre in Transport and Logistics 
Management 
The University of Sydney   NSW 2006   Australia 
Telephone: +612  9114 1824 
E-mail: business.itlsinfo@sydney.edu.au 
Internet: http://sydney.edu.au/business/itls 
DATE: September 2014 
 
 
 
The Role of Source Preference and Subjective Probability in Valuing Expected Travel Time Savings 
Hensher, Li and Ho 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
Travel time variability, a feature of transport systems, is gaining interest as congestion and system 
unreliability (both on the road and in public transport) become daily occurrences and a major concern 
for service providers and politicians. Gaver (1968) is one of the earliest studies that investigated 
individuals’ behavioural responses to travel time variability, including it within a framework based on 
utility maximisation, and found that a traveller would plan an earlier departure time when facing 
travel time variability, compared with the circumstance with certain travel times. This typical 
behaviour is explained by the notion of a “safety margin” proposed by Knight (1974). Since the early 
1990s, the focus of research has been on empirically estimating the value of willingness to pay (WTP) 
for improved travel time reliability (see e.g., Small et al., 1999; Bates et al. 2001; Bhat and Sardesai 
2006, Hensher et al., 2011) assuming degrees of risk aversion; however the majority of the studies 
have assumed risk neutrality. 
 
In recognising that travel times vary for a repeated trip activity (such as the commuting trip), 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) has been drawn on as the representation of travel time variability, 
known as Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) (Noland and Small 1995), which involves a choice 
process in which the alternative with the highest value of expected utility is preferred. Since Noland 
and Small’s seminal paper in 1995, this has become the standard approach in travel time reliability 
studies (see e.g., Small et al. 1999; Bates et al. 2001; Hollander 2006; Asensio and Matas 2008). The 
research focus is to estimate the value of reliability (VOR) or variability, along with the value of 
travel time savings (VTTS); while some recent studies (see e.g., Hensher et al. 2011, 2013) have 
focused on the valuation of expected travel time (probability weighted time), arguing that the 
distinction between VTTS and VOR is not necessary when the full travel time distribution for a given 
trip on repeated occasions is recognised.  
 
The most common approach to accommodating trip time variability in the valuation of travel time 
reliability is a stated choice experiment. This paper highlights a potential limitation of the traditional 
stated choice (SC) experiment which predefines the attribute levels (including attribute occurrence 
probabilities) under a specific statistical design rule such as D-optimality, in contrast to behavioural 
relevance. We question the merits of the traditional SC experiment in circumstances where statistical 
precision could be a high price for behavioural relevance. This means that an individual is advised of 
the variations in travel time for a repeated trip (such as the regular commute) and is told of the 
occurrence (or likelihood) of a specified travel time occurring. In reality, it is common to recognise 
that individuals form beliefs and opinions about the likely travel time, and this is known as the 
subjective probability associated with the occurrence of the perceived level of a specific attribute.  
 
The challenge is to find a way to recognise and accommodate this feature of choice making in choice 
studies, be they linked to a stated choice experiment or some modification of the standard information 
sought under a revealed preference regime. There appears to be (at least) two ways to resolve this. 
One approach is to stay with the traditional stated choice experiment design pedagogy and to find a 
way of conditioning the objective probabilities associated with specific attribute outcomes so that a 
subjective assessment is invoked. A promising way is through an additional belief-based weighting 
which imposes some subjective perceptual conditioning on the role of the offered objective 
probability. The second approach involves abandoning some of the strict design features, that are 
essentially statistical and not necessarily behavioural, and adopting a method such as the one used in 
this paper which is a modified revealed preference approach1. The latter approach introduces an 
1 This may also be a way to use the idea of a reference (or status quo) alternative to define the attribute levels in 
a choice experiment; however the probabilities associated with the incidence of specific attribute levels such as 
travel time will no longer be the subjective levels, although now we have a bounding guide based on the 
subjective levels. 
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additional behavioural perspective to the concept of travel time variability, by embedding subjective 
probabilities and sources of influence on uncertainty of occurrences (referred to as source preference) 
into the behavioural specification.  
 
This paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a review of existing travel time 
variability studies using stated choice methods, and identifies a potential limitation associated with 
using an objective approach to represent travel time variability. We then discuss the differences 
between risk and uncertainty, and introduce the concept of subjective probability for decision making 
under uncertainty. This is followed by a comparison of different approaches to eliciting subjective 
probabilities using evidence from the psychological literature. A new revealed preference data set of 
commuter mode choice, collected in 2014, is used to demonstrate the role of source preference and its 
implications for valuation of expected travel time savings. The concluding section highlights avenues 
for future travel time variability research. 
 
2. Existing Travel Time Variability Research: An Overview 
 
The MEU framework is the generally accepted state-of-practice method to measuring and valuing 
travel time variability (see Li et al. 2010a for a review). The progression from traditional Random 
Utility Maximisation (RUM)  to MEU not only changes the specification of a utility function that 
incorporates travel time reliability, it also leads to significant innovation in the way that stated choice 
experiments have to be designed to capture travel time variability. In recognition that travel time does 
vary, a series of arrival times (or travel times), rather than the extent and frequency of delay, have 
been considered in recent stated choice (SC) experiments (see, e.g., Small et al. 1999; Hollander 2006; 
Asensio and Matas 2008; Batley and Ibáñez 2009; Li et al. 2010a). However, in SC studies that do not 
incorporate a EUT probability weighting function, travel time variability is typically presented by the 
extent and frequency of delay relative to ‘normal’ travel time (see e.g., Jackson and Jucker 1982).  
  
In terms of a modelling framework, the mean-variance model and the scheduling model are the two 
dominant approaches in the transport literature. While most stated preference experiments are similar 
to the approach developed by Small et al. (1999) (see Figure 1) with some slight changes (e.g., some 
used vertical bars to represent travel times (e.g., Batley and Ibáñez 2009), some provided 10 travel 
times instead of five (see e.g., Bates et al. 2001, and some show the departure time explicitly to the 
respondents (e.g., Holland 2006)). The behavioural paradigm widely used in the MEU model is a mix 
of RUM and EUT (i.e., a linear utility specification with linear probability weighting).   
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Figure 1: A choice example from Small et al. (1999) 
 
In addition to RUM and MEU, a relatively small number of transportation studies have adopted 
alternative behavioural theories to analyse travellers’ choices given the presence of travel time 
variability. For example, Prospect Theory (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979 for its original version 
and Tversky and Kahneman 1992 for its cumulative version) has become increasingly popular in 
traveller behaviour studies (see Li and Hensher 2011 for a review of Prospect Theoretic contributions 
in traveller behaviour research). In addition to Prospect Theory (PT), other alternative theories have 
been adopted by transport researchers, such as Expected Utility Theory (see e.g., Senna 1993; Polak et 
al. 2008; Li et al. 2010b), Extended EUT (see Hensher et al. 2013), and Rank-Dependent Utility 
Theory (RDUT) (see e.g., Michea and Polak 2006; Hensher and Li 2012), mainly using stated choice 
methods.  
 
Michea and Polak (2006) and Polak et al. (2008) used SC data collected by Bates et al. (2001) shown 
in Figure 2, in which respondents were presented two train operators with different fares, timetables, 
and combinations of 10 equally possible arrivals (early or late) at the destination in terms of the 
clockface of cards for each alternative. Senna (1994) used an SC experiment, shown in Table 1, where 
one route has no travel time variability on five occasions, and the alternative route has different levels 
of mean travel times and variability, along with cost. The choice response is sought from a five-point 
semantic scale. Both designs are similar to the one shown in Figure 1 by Small et al. (1999).  
 
 
Figure 2: A choice example from Bates et al. (2001) 
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Table 1: A SP task from Senna (1994) 
 
 
A series of studies by Hensher, Rose and Li used an alternative design, given available data, (see 
Figure 3), which assumes a fixed level for arriving earlier or later (e.g., arriving 6 minutes earlier and 
24 minutes later) within each choice scenario. This contrasts with Small et al. (1999) who presented 
five equally likely arrival times (see Figure 1) for a journey to respondents, along with the extent of 
arriving earlier (or later) than an average travel time, which can be varied within a choice set (e.g., for 
early arrival: 7 minutes, 4 minutes and 1 minutes; for late arrival: 5 minutes and 9 minutes). However, 
between choice scenarios, the design used by Hensher and Li varies the probability of early, on-time 
or late arrivals, and hence recognises the stochastic nature of a travel time distribution (e.g., the 
probability of arriving early can vary from 10 percent to 40 percent). In contrast, the probability 
associated with each possible travel outcome is fixed (i.e., if there are five travel times for an 
alternative, then each has a probability of 0.2) in designs such as Small et al. (1999) and Asensio and 
Matas (2008), or not mentioned (but assuming that travel times are equally distributed when 
estimating models) in experiments such as Bates et al. (2001) and Hollander (2006). Although this 
design offers some differences, the probabilities of different travel scenarios are designed and 
exogenously presented to respondents, as other travel time reliability studies have done.  
 
 
Figure 3: Illustrative stated choice screen of an alternative design  
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The common theme to all of the existing travel time variability studies cited above is that objective 
probabilities were used to describe a decision maker’s perception of the travel time distribution, and 
hence the understanding of travel time variability is within the risk domain, given that risk relates to a 
given or known probability of occurrence distribution. We argue that subjective probability needs to 
be addressed in order to more meaningfully represent the perceptual nature of travel time variability. 
The reality is that the perception of unreliability in travel times may differ across respondents. This 
moves the approach into the realm of uncertainty. 
 
3. The Distinction between Uncertainty and Risk 
 
Knight (1921), in the first study that addressed the distinction between uncertainty and risk argued 
that the economic environment is characterised by unmeasurable uncertainty rather than measurable 
risk. If a choice is made under risk, objective probabilities are known, since decision makers have the 
full picture of all potential outcomes. For example, the objective probability of betting on the flip of a 
fair coin can be calculated (i.e., 0.5). However, such objective probabilistic information about the 
occurrence of events is not available in decision making under uncertainty (e.g., the likelihood of a 
road accident). Ellsberg’s two-colour paradox (Ellsberg 1961) revealed that people prefer to bet on 
drawing a red or black ball from an urn which has 50 red and 50 black balls (under risk) than from 
another urn containing 100 red and black balls in unknown proportions (under uncertainty). When the 
choice is made under uncertainty, decision makers have to assess the probabilities of potential 
outcomes with some degree of vagueness associated with their beliefs (i.e., subjective probabilities).  
 
As highlighted above, travel time variability is typically random and unsystematic. Noland and Polak 
(2002) emphasised that the difference between travel time variability and congestion is linked, in that 
travellers have difficulty in predicting the latter (e.g., congestion caused by unforeseen road accidents 
or service cancellations) from day to day, while they can, to some extent, predict the variation in 
travel time due to congestion (e.g., peak hours vs. off-peak hours). This concept of unsystematic and 
unpredictable travel time variability is reinforced in a series of studies (see Bates et al. 2001 and Li et 
al. 2010a among others). In reality, travellers need to assess the probability distribution of possible 
travel times for a future trip based on their experience, beliefs, etc. Hence, the decision-making 
process with travel time variability is better described under uncertainty rather than risk. 
 
However, the distinction between uncertainty and risk has not been clearly addressed in the travel 
time reliability literature. Some studies use ‘risk’ to describe variability in travel time. For example, 
Senna (1994) used risk averse, neutral or loving to specify individuals’ risk attitudes in the face of 
travel time variability; in a EUT framework. Batley and Ibáñez (2009) interpreted travel time 
variability as ‘time risk’. The concept of travel time variability is strictly uncertainty rather than risk, 
with any ambiguity leading to a crucial problem in understanding the subjective nature of travel time 
reliability. 
 
A real challenge for modellers, given the popularity of stated choice experiments, is how to 
accommodate the perceptual or subjective feature of perceptual conditioning into a choice experiment. 
Given that choice experiments ‘impose’ attribute levels, if we are to continue to use choice 
experiments we will need to find a mechanism to ‘adjust’ the objective levels of relevant attributes so 
as to represent the re-interpretation that is the basis of choice making. Alternatively, we may have to 
abandon the stated choice approach and rethink how revealed preference data can be used to obtain 
the relevant data on subjective levels.  
 
There is an extensive literature in psychology that promotes the idea of a belief-based measure of 
outcome probability associated with a particular attribute (in our case it is travel time variability), 
which enables us to identify the likely levels that a subject actually processes (probability ambiguity), 
and what we call the equivalent subjective or belief adjusted attribute-specific outcome probability. 
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This is aligned with the idea of source preference (discussed in a later section). This is essentially a 
way of recognising and accommodating uncertainty, which may reduce the appeal of stated choice 
studies in favour of a revised revealed preference setting. 
   
4. The Implication of Decision under Uncertainty on Travel 
Time Reliability Experiments: Subjective Probability  
 
The concept of subjective probability was originally proposed by Ramsay (1931) and further 
developed by Savage (1954). Subjective probabilities represent “degrees of belief in the truth of 
particular propositions”, which reflect individuals’ assessment based on their knowledge and opinions 
(Ayton and Wright 1994, p.164). Therefore, subjective probabilities actually represent the facts about 
a decision maker, not about the world, which arose as a response to the failure of frequency-based 
objective probability theory, when there is the occurrence of uncertain events (Pollock 2006). 
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) used the horse race as a descriptive example of subjective probability, 
where individuals made bets according to their subjective probabilities of each horse winning with 
uncertain consequences. However, risky gambles, such as a roulette wheel, have a finite set of 
terminal outcomes associated with objective probabilities. Ferrell (1994, p.413) concluded that 
“subjective probability can enter at any stage of the decision analysis process, implicitly and explicitly 
as a way of dealing with uncertainty … as the means of quantifying the uncertainties in the models 
that relate the alternatives to possible consequences.” However, subjective probabilities are still 
constrained by the axioms of classical probability theory2 (Ayton and Wright 1994). For example, the 
sum of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of events is one (see Hensher and Li 2014).  
 
According to Vick (2002, p.3), the operational explanation of subjective probability is: “the 
probability of an uncertain event is the quantified measure of one’s belief or confidence in the 
outcome, according to their state of knowledge at the time it is assessed”. Besides emphasising 
personal belief and knowledge, this definition also mentioned the assessment time of subjective 
probability. The judgement of a future travel time distribution is determined by an individual’s belief 
(e.g., an optimistic decision maker would over-estimate the probability of arriving on time) and 
circumstance (e.g., departure time). As an example, Bates et al. (2001) defined total travel time 
( htT( ) ) to consist of free flow time ( fT ), congestion time ( xT ), and travel time variability ( rT ), with 
the last two elements dependent on departure time ( ht ), given in equation (1). All evidence suggests 
that travel time variability (i.e., a type of uncertainty) should be represented by subjective probability. 
 
h h hf x rt t tT( ) T T T ( )( )= + +        (1) 
 
It is clear that subjective probabilities should be used when respondents face travel time variability 
questions, i.e., decision making under uncertainty. Ramsey (1931) proposed two ways to identify 
subjective probability: (i) introspective interpretation, i.e., measuring subjective probabilities by 
asking respondents; and (ii) behaviourist interpretation, i.e., defining subjective probabilities as a 
2 Which begins with a set of hypothetical elements, consisting of individual elements (A, B, etc.) and their 
unions ( A B∪ ), intersects ( A B∩ ) and complements ( A-B ), and a number can be assigned to each of these 
elements. For an empty element, the assigned number is 0. The number assigned to a subset of elements is equal 
to the sum of the numbers assigned to each of its constituent elements (i.e., additively). The number assigned to 
the set of all elements is 1. The assigned numbers must be between 0 and 1, and the system is additive. See 
Beach and Connolly (2005) for more details. 
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theoretical entity inferred from a choice3. The behaviourist interpretation (i.e., subjective probabilities 
can be estimated from observed preference) was the dominant approach to the elicitation of subjective 
probabilities before the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961). Based on the behaviourist interpretation, 
Savage (1954) also suggested that the decision rule under uncertainty is to maximise expected utility 
based on assigned probabilities (i.e., Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT)). This normative 
theory has no distinctive difference between risk and uncertainty, which also suggested that 
uncertainty may be equivalent to risk for a rational man.  
 
Given that subjective probabilities elicited from choice (i.e., the behaviourist interpretation) are 
always calculated based on the linear functional form, coherent probabilities cannot be assigned to an 
individual, unless their attitude toward uncertainty is neutral (Baron and Frisch 1994). Ellsberg 
(1961) also provided sufficient evidence about the violation of SEUT. Since the 1980s, there 
have been an increasing number of studies in the area of psychology, behavioural and 
experimental economics, which directly asked respondents for their probability judgements 
over certain outcomes (see e.g., Kahneman et al. 1982; Heath and Tversky 1991; Fox and 
Tversky 1998; Wu and Gonzalez 1999; Takahashi et al. 2007). For example, Heath and 
Tversky (1991) asked respondents to give probability assessments on football predictions and 
political predictions, and found that uncertainty has an impact on preference.  
 
In Wu and Gonzalez (1999), respondents were asked to provide their personal probability assessments 
on a number of events (e.g., national election and the number of University of Washington football 
team victories), and their judged probabilities were mapped into decision weights through the non-
linear probability weighting function, which they referred to as a two-stage modelling process. Beach 
and Connolly (2005) defined the elicitation of subjective probability as “asking people to give a 
number to represent their option about the probability of an event”. Fox and See (2003, p.307) 
summarised some characteristics of subjective probability as follows: (i) subadditivity: “the 
probability of an uncertain event is generally less than the sum of probabilities of constituent events” 
( 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ... ( )msp A sp a sp a sp a≤ + + , where ( )sp A  is the subjective probability for the whole event 
A, and ( )msp a  is the subjective probability for the 
thm  constituent event), and (ii) description 
dependent: “as the description of the target event is unpacked into an explicit disjunction of 
constituent events, judged probability may increase”.4  
 
With this clarification of uncertainty and subjective probability, we can revisit the two examples of 
stated choice experiments that were discussed in the previous section, as ways to incorporate travel 
time variability (Figures 1 and 3). The example in Figure 1 (the dominant design in the literature) 
explicitly tells respondents that they have an equal chance of five arriving times, i.e., 0.2 for each time 
and for all respondents, where the expected value is indeed the average. Although, the experiment in 
Figure 3 allows for variation in induced probabilities of early, on-time and late arrival, those 
probabilities were designed, and hence are objective, and which consequently may not necessarily 
reflect individuals’ true circumstances: beliefs, knowledge and the time assessed. Both designs place 
travel time variability in the risk domain and fail to address each respondents’ personal beliefs and 
assessments, and the consequence is that uncertainty (travel time variability) has been treated as risk.  
 
Since travel time variability is best described under uncertainty rather than risk, respondents should be 
asked to provide their judged probabilities associated with different travel outcomes (i.e., subjective 
probabilities for uncertainty) in a choice study. Therefore, instead of designing the probabilities for 
arriving early, on time and late (see Figure 3) exogenously (i.e., objective probabilities for risk), 
respondents should assess these probabilities and provide their own subjective probabilities for early, 
3 See von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986, pp.116-117) on how subjective probabilities are estimated from 
observed choice. 
4 We interchangeably use judged probability and subjective probability in this paper. Other studies, however, 
explicitly distinguish the role of judged versus subjective probabilities (see Fox and See 2003). 
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on-time and late arrival based on their experience, judgment and departure times. Besides asking 
respondents to provide their judged probabilities of possible travel scenarios, the numbers of minutes 
earlier than expected and later than expected are also endogenous and hence subjective. The 
variability in travel times has two dimensions (the extent and the likelihood), which both represent the 
facts about a traveller. This imposes a major limitation on choice experiments since the analyst cannot 
design them on behalf of each respondent through an SC experiment where the focus has been on 
statistical efficiency (recognising however to some degree, the desirable behavioural relationships 
between attributes, their levels and alternatives). This necessitates a major rethink as to the 
appropriateness of SC experiments and a possible return to a modified revealed preference approach 
(as implemented in section 7 below). 
 
We do not believe that stated choice experiments can account for uncertainty; however before moving 
to a revealed preference setting, it is useful to comment briefly on reference (revealed preference) or 
status quo pivot-based designs that bring design levels of attributes ‘closer’ to the levels 
experienced in real markets. A pivot design entails constructing the SC alternatives by 
pivoting them off of a respondent’s real experience (revealed preference - RP) (see e.g., 
Hensher and Greene 2003; Hensher 2004, 2006, 2010; Rose et al. 2008). The key advantages 
of pivoting include: (i) more realism in the stated choice experiment since hypothetical 
alternatives are around the RP alternative (status quo) 5, and (ii) better specificity in the 
context of the choice task (Train and Wilson 2008). Unfortunately such designs confound subjective 
and objective attribute levels in that the levels designed for the SC alternatives are not judged levels. 
Consequently this fails to recognise belief based systems that underpin judged or subjective attribute 
levels.   
 
Given the discussion thus far, four levels of subjectivity and objectivity in the data on repeated 
occurrence of an attribute and its occurrence likelihood, can be constructed (see Table 2): (i) Fully 
objective (FO) where probabilities (e.g., early, on-time and late; or longest, shortest and most common) 
and attributes (e.g., three travel times) are objective (i.e., OPs and OAs); (ii) Partially subjective 
(PS(1)) where probabilities are objective (OPs) while attributes are subjective (SAs);  (iii) Partially 
subjective (PS(2)) where probabilities are subjective (SPs) while attributes are objective (OAs); and 
(iv) fully subjective where probabilities and attributes are subjective (i.e., SPs and SAs).  
 
Table 2: Four levels of subjectivity and objectivity in experiments 
Level i FO      = OPs+OAs 
Level ii PS(1)  = OPs+SAs 
Level iii PS(2)  = SPs+OAs 
Level iv FS      = SPs+SAs 
5 Hensher (2010) concluded after an extensive review of the literature on hypothetical bias as follows: “A way 
forward within the context of choice experiments, when the interest is on estimating [marginal willingness to 
pay] MWTP under conditions of habit, which is common in many transport applications, is to recognise the real 
market information present in a reference alternative. What we find, empirically, is that when a pivoted design is 
used for constructing choice experiments, and the model is specified to have estimated parameters of time and 
cost that are different for the reference alternative than the hypothetical alternatives, the estimated value of 
travel time savings is higher for the reference alternative than for the hypothetical alternatives. This model 
specification is not the specification that researchers have generally used with data from pivoted experimental 
designs. Usually, time and cost are specified to have the same parameters for the reference and hypothetical 
alternatives. The proposal herein for reducing hypothetical bias (given the Brownstone-Small ‘benchmark’), is 
to use a pivoted design and allow different parameters for the reference and hypothetical alternatives.”  This 
adds realism but not source preference. 
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Notes: 
FO: fully objective, PS(1): Partially subjective 
PS(2): Partially subjective, FS: fully subjective 
SPs: Subjective probabilities, SAs: Subjective attributes 
OPs : Objective probabilities, OAs: Objective attributes 
 
The majority of previous travel time reliability studies are established on the FO level, where travel 
times and associated probabilities are objective and exogenous. An exception is the design shown in 
Figure 3 (used in Li et al. 2010 and Hensher and Li 2012) which included supplementary questions to 
elicit from respondents the experienced range of travel times for the referenced trip. This information 
helped identify the range of minutes arriving earlier or later than the expected (normal) time used in 
the design. However, the associated probabilities were objective. Hence it is a PS(1) design.6  
 
The discussion herein suggests that the traditional SC paradigm may better be replaced with what 
might be best referred to as an extended revealed preference ‘experiment’, if subjective probabilities 
and subjective attribute levels are required for all alternatives. The repetition of information based on 
prior experience and future expectations conditioned on accumulated belief employed in the proposed 
approach may provide a better paradigm for understanding choice making under uncertainty.  
 
5. The Implications on Choice Modelling of Decision Making 
under Uncertainty  
5.1 Savage’s Subjective Expected Utility Theory and its Violation (Ellsberg’s Paradox) as 
the precursor to Source Preference 
 
Savage’s Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT) is one the earliest expositions of uncertainty. 
SEUT, based on Expected Utility Theory (EUT), assumes that the objective of a decision maker is to 
maximise expected utility defined over final outcomes.  Savage’s Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) 
model is a classical normative model of decision under uncertainty, where utility of each potential 
consequence is weighted by subjective probability, as shown in equation (2): 
 
[ ( )]( ) m mm U xSEU x sprob=∑         (2) 
  
( )mU x  is the utility of the 
thm outcome and sprobm is the associated subjective probability. The 
decision maker chooses the act that maximises subjective expected utility (SEU). In Savage’s SEU 
model, subjective probability and utility can be inferred simultaneously from observed preferences. 
For example, if there is no difference in a subject choosing: (1) winning $10 if tomorrow rains and 
nothing if not, and (2) a sure win of $5 (winning $10 for a head when tossing a fair coin (with an 
objective probability of 0.5)), then we can infer a subjective probability is 0.5. The number of sure 
wins can be varied so to identify individuals’ beliefs (subjective probabilities). 
 
The most significant assumption of SEUT is the ‘sure-thing’ principle. That is, if two acts have the 
same outcome given a particular state, the preferences between acts are independent of that common 
outcome (Savage 1954). The sure-thing principle allows for the measure of subjective probabilities to 
be linear-additive. However, Ellsberg’s paradox (Ellsberg 1961) revealed evidence which violates this 
fundamental principle of SEUT. Ellsberg’s two-colour example suggests that people are more willing 
to bet in the situation with objective (or provided) probabilities than with subjective (or judged) 
6 In addition to the absence of subjective probabilities, another limitation of this design is that there is no 
variation in the minutes of being earlier or later within a choice set (i.e., same minutes (x and y) apply to all 
three alternative routes within a choice). A revised design should address this variation. 
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probabilities. This typical behaviour is referred to as ‘uncertainty or ambiguity aversion’, which also 
highlights the important distinction between risk and uncertainty.  
 
5.2 Uncertainty Aversion and Source Preference 
 
In the real world, decision makers often need to judge the probabilities of potential consequences by 
themselves (e.g., the outcome of a football match), based on their beliefs, knowledge and even the 
time when they make the assessment. Hence they are uncertain about those judged probabilities, due 
to missing information. Uncertainty aversion (i.e., less ambiguous information is preferred) is shown 
by probability ambiguity (i.e., the range of subjective probabilities) in Ellsberg’s paradox:  
 
“An individual . . . can always assign relative likelihoods to the states of nature. But 
how does he act in the presence of uncertainty? The answer to that may depend on 
another judgment, about the reliability, credibility, or adequacy of his information 
(including his relevant experience, advice and intuition) as a whole.” (Ellsberg, 1961, p. 
659) 
 
The violation of the sure-thing principle suggests that SEUT cannot accommodate this behaviour. 
Rank-Dependent Utility Theory and Prospect Theory are sufficient to explain decision under risk 
(known probabilities), but not enough for decision under uncertainty (unknown probabilities). 
Ellsberg’s paradox (two-colour balls) revealed uncertainty aversion. It would be more uncertain to 
correctly guess its colour when drawing a ball from the urn which has 100 red and black balls in 
unknown proportions than from another urn containing 50 red and 50 black balls, because their 
sources of uncertainty are different. Hence source preference must be addressed when a decision is 
made under uncertainty. In the current study we are focussing on a single but repeated event, namely 
the commuting trip, and suggest that an individual’s willingness to make a judgment on an uncertain 
event (i.e., a commuting trip travel time) depends not only on the degree of uncertainty but also on its 
source.  Source preference is exhibited if someone prefers to make a judgment informed from one 
source rather than a judgment informed from another source. In this study the source preference is 
consistent with the competence hypothesis (Heath and Tversky 1999) which proposes that individuals 
often prefer ambiguous ability-based prospects to unambiguous chance-based prospects. According to 
the competence hypothesis (Heath & Tversky 1991), this pattern derives from favourable perceptions 
of one’s competence7. In studying the phenomenon of commuting travel time variability and its role 
in travel choice making, the source of preference revelation is expertise in commuting where beliefs 
associated with commuting travel time, even if vague (and possibly unobserved or measured), are 
brought to bear in preference to those on matched chance events, which may be the alternative 
preference response context for non-commuters.  
 
Fox and Tversky (1998) suggested a belief-based approach to decision making under uncertainty 
which involves a further transformation (ϖ ) on the basis of nonlinear probability weighting for risky 
events. The example of a belief-based approach in the current study is the respondents views on what 
they believe are likely (i.e., subjectively perceived) travel times under repeated commuter trip making 
behaviour (see empirical application in a later section). In the psychology literature this is referred to 
as probability judgements that are used (in the context of a belief-based account) to predict decisions 
under uncertainty. This approach accommodates source preference, while maintaining the segregation 
7 There is no guarantee that this is always the preferred situation. Klein et al. (2010) found that participants 
preferred an unambiguous chance-based option to an ambiguous ability-based option when the ambiguity 
derived from chance rather than uncertainty about one’s own ability. 
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of belief (i.e., judged (subjective) probability) and preference. This transformation for capturing 
source preference is given in equation (3), proposed by Fox and Tversky (page 893):   
 
[ ( )]mw sprob θϖ =           (3) 
 
where sprobm is the subjective probability for the occurrence of  the mth outcome, w is some 
probability weighting function8,  \ 1θ ≠ reveals the different source between risk (given probabilities) 
and uncertainty (judged probabilities). This difference is the basis of an adjustment required in model 
estimation when an individual is initially offered ‘given probabilities’ in a choice experiment. Source 
preference can be defined empirically by a number of candidate constructs; however the notion of 
belief offers an appealing interpretation of the perceptual conditioning mechanism and aligns well 
with Ellsberg’s contribution.  
 
Our preferred interpretation of source preference is based on two points9: ‘A belief in the likelihood of 
the target event’ (language of Fox and Tversky) which is used to refer to the decision weight 
expression (linked to gamma), and the overall function wθ which reflects an individual’s preference to 
‘bet’ on that belief.  We have assumed that commuters as a group are much more able to express a 
preference to bet on the belief in the occurrence of commuting travel times than non-commuters 
where the latter might be expected to be more prone to betting on matched chance events. The 
basketball sample used in Fox and Tversky to study betting on basketball is the equivalent to our 
commuters making probabilistic judgments on the occurrence of commuting travel times. 
 
 
Hensher et al. (2013a) used belief weights in another study but not in the context of travel time 
variability. Belief weights can be constructed on a (subjective) probability scale. Hensher et al. (2013) 
focused on the voting (in a referendum) implications associated with recognising degrees of belief 
when assessing buy in via a voting choice model to alternative road pricing schemes. Degrees of 
belief underlie decision weights that provide perceptual conditioning of subjective probability 
judgments associated with the extent to which each proposed road pricing scheme is perceived by a 
respondent as making them better or worse off. This evidence, derived directly as a numerical 
probability judgment, plays an important role in conditioning the marginal (dis)utility attached to the 
elements of a road pricing scheme. Such conditioning is aimed at increasing, ex ante, the external 
validity of voting preferences in a referendum context. Hensher et al. (2013a) obtain a numerical 
subjective probability belief judgment through direct questioning of individuals. For example, in 
terms of a proposed road pricing scheme: 
 
Suppose that the government were to introduce a distance-based car use charge of X c/km at 
congested (peak) periods and Y c/km at un-congested (off-peak) periods throughout Sydney {or in 
the Sydney Central Business District} together with a reduction in fuel excise of Tc/litre and a 
reduction in annual car registration charge of $W per annum.  
To what extent do you think that each of these schemes will make you better (or worse) off? (0=not 
at all, 100=definitely).   
 
This measure was used to obtain probabilistic belief weights, denoted by P(Z), where Z is a subjective 
belief response scale (0-100) associated with the road pricing scheme attributes in the utility 
expression for each alternative. It is well recognised in the psychology literature (see Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992) that degrees of belief are implicit in most decisions whose outcomes depend on 
uncertain events. In quantitative theories of decision making such as subjective expected utility theory 
or prospect theory, degrees of belief are related to decision weights and are typically identified by 
either prescribed levels as part of alternatives in a choice experiment or in a more direct manner using 
8 Which could be linear or non-linear. 
9 Fox and Tversky in a footnote (18) offer the prospect for accommodating source preference by varying the 
parameter of the risky weighting function, which is the gamma in our model. 
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a linguistic device such as judgments of numerical probability. Such estimates are often viewed as an 
approximation to the degrees of belief implicit in decisions or preference revelation (see Fox 1999).  
 
It is well recognised that numerical probability judgments are often based on heuristics that produce 
biases. One of the methods proposed to accommodate some aspects of such potential bias was the idea 
of a decision weight (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) which accounts for the presence of perceptual 
conditioning in the way that information reported by decision makers or information offered to 
decision makers is heuristically processed. Specifically, the value of an outcome is weighted not by its 
probability but instead by a decision (or belief) weight, w (·), that represents the impact of the relevant 
probability on the valuation of the prospect. w(.) need not be interpreted as a measure of subjective 
belief – a person may believe that the probability of a road pricing scheme making them better off is, 
for example 0.5, but afford this event a weight of more or less than 0.5 in the evaluation of a prospect. 
Hence the notion of source preference is a way of capturing the essence of subjective probability. 
Various functional forms have been proposed to capture the role of such decision weights (see 
Hensher et al. 2011 for some examples and one form we use in the empirical study below). 
 
6. Source Preference and Travel Time Uncertainty 
 
To investigate the way in which source preferences can be built into an empirical choice model, and 
to contrast the evidence on the value of expected travel time savings under uncertainty with the 
‘standard’ derivation of the value of expected travel time savings, we had to collect new data. We 
were surprised to find that there does not appear to have been any previous study that has focussed on 
subjective attribute levels and associated subjective probabilities for travel times (i.e., level iv).  
 
For the probability weighting process under uncertainty, the first step is to ask respondents to provide 
their judged (subjective) probabilities ( msprob ) of target events, and the second step is to weight 
those judged probabilities by using a nonlinear probability weighting function for risk (i.e., risky 
weighting function). The distinction between decision under risk and uncertainty is captured in the 
further transformation of decision weights, which indicates individuals’ source preference through the 
source preference parameter (θ).  
 
Given the new data from a real market, we can use a modelling framework which is capable of 
accommodating all important aspects of decision making under uncertainty including the attitude 
towards uncertainty, subjective probabilities, probability weighting and source preference, which is 
given in Figure 4 as suggested by Fox and See (2003).  
 
The modelling process shown in Figure 4 integrates two essential components of research in 
behavioural decision theory: (i) the analysis of decision under risk (e.g., decisions weight in Prospect 
Theory and Rank-Dependent Utility Theory) and (ii) the study of judgment under uncertainty (e.g., 
subjective probability). It also extends Prospect Theory by teasing apart the role of personal belief and 
source preference in the weighting process.  
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Figure 4: The process for modelling decision under uncertainty 
Source: Fox and See (2003) 
 
7. The Empirical Study 
7.1. Data and models 
 
An online survey was undertaken in March 2014 using a sample of car and public transport 
commuters in the Sydney metropolitan area. The data focussed on commuters who are regular users 
of car as a driver or public transport (single modal or multimodal of bus, train and ferry). To be 
eligible for the survey, at least one public transport (PT) option must be available to car commuters 
for commuting if they wanted to use it and vice versa for PT commuters. A target sample of 1,000 
commuters (500 PT and 500 car commuters) was sought with the help of SSI, an online survey 
company. Respondents were recruited via email directing them to a customised online survey. In total, 
4,046 invitation emails were sent and a sample of 994 qualified respondents (474 PT commuters and 
520 car commuters) was obtained (a response rate of 25%). Compared to the 2011 journey to work 
census data, the sample on average has a higher income ($76,930 vs. $57,660 per annum), works 
shorter hours (29 vs. 34 hours per week), and includes more women (57% vs. 44%) and older workers 
(40.36 years vs. 39.08 years). 
 
Commuters were asked to report three perceived commuting times and the likelihood of experiencing 
each travel time. The survey also included questions relating to travel cost, fuel consumption of the 
car used for commuting, number of times using car and public transport for commuting in the last two 
months, as well as socio-economic characteristics such as age, income, occupation and household car 
ownership. A process of cleaning and validating the data reduced the sample to 627 usable 
observations. Inconsistencies between reported household size and household structure and between 
public transport fares and toll costs of different travel outcomes are the main reasons for removing 
observations from the final dataset. Other reasons for dropping out observations include average 
speed being too slow or too fast and time variability across three possible travel outcomes being too 
much (more than 4 times) or too little (no time variability). Summary statistics of the sample are 
provided in Table 3 with the practical implementation being shown in a screen shot of the survey 
instrument in Figure 5.  
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of the sample 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Age (years) 39.08 14.11 
Female 0.57 0.50 
Weekly working hours 29.04 8.17 
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Personal income before tax ('000$) 76.93 43.83 
Number of household cars 1.67 0.88 
Number of household adults 2.22 0.82 
Number of household children 0.74 0.96 
Number of times commuting by PT in last 2 months a  6.94 7.08 
Number of times commuting by car in last 2 months a 7.46 5.83 
Shortest commuting time (minute) 27.46 16.18 
Most likely commuting time (minute) 36.13 18.18 
Longest commuting time (minute) 45.98 22.74 
Likelihood of having shortest time (%) 36.25 24.78 
Likelihood of having most likely time (%) 41.25 24.18 
Likelihood of having longest time (%) 22.28 16.62 
Travel cost weighted by probability ($) 6.55 7.53 
a The sample includes car commuters and PT commuters, with the number of times commuting by a specific 
mode over 16 provided in the questionnaire as 16+ and recoded as 16 for analysis. 
 
Figure 5: A screen shot of questions asked in the online survey 
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As shown in Figure 5, all respondents were asked to provide the likelihood of three possible outcomes 
of an alternative mode even if they never used it to commute. Instructions were provided to help 
commuters judge the likelihood of the three possible outcomes based on their recent experience (for 
those who have used alternative mode to commute) or perceptions of what it is likely to be. This is in 
line with the underlying theory of our binary model which predicts a lower probability for non-chosen 
alternatives, reflecting that people prefer alternative with known proportion of occurrence (i.e., 
subjective probability) to the alternative with unknown proportion (non-chosen alternative with less 
certain or unknown likelihood of occurrence, also see discussion in section 3). 
 
A non-linear decision weight form is constructed to capture source preference in a binary model 
framework with the choice variable being commuting mode (car vs. PT). Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) provided parametric formulae for the value functions under a constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) assumption, as well as a one-parameter probability weighting function. The probability 
weighting function suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is chosen and is given in equation 
(4)10. γ is the probability weighting parameter to be estimated, which measures the degree of curvature 
(or source sensitivity) of the weighting function. Equation (4) when scaled by the source preference 
parameter, θ, is the expression for ϖ  in equation (3). 
 
 
1( )
[ (1 ) ]
m
m
m m
pw p
p p
γ
γ γ γ
=
+ −        (4)   
The utility expression associated with each alternative that accounts for source preference and risk 
attitude for travel time is given in equation (5).  
The equation is based on Hensher et al. (2011)’s Extended EUT (EEUT) model form which allows for 
perceptual conditioning (or decisions weights) associated with prospect theory, but which is not a 
fully specific prospect theoretic model because it does not account for asymmetry in gains and losses. 
 
1
( )
Z
z z
z
U EEUT U Sβ
=
= +∑         (5) 
where 1 1 11 1 2 1( ) [ ( ) ( ) ... ( ) ]/(1 )x R REEUT U w p x w p x w p x
θ α θ α θ αβ α− − −= + + + −   (6) 
 
( )W P  is a non-linear subjective probability weighting function which converts raw subjective 
probabilities (P) associated with perceived attribute levels x1, x2, … xR with R levels over R occurrences; 
and α, γ, θ and β have to be estimated; (1-α) indicates the attitude towards risk, θ is the source 
preference parameter that identifies deviations of uncertainty from risk, and β is the marginal 
(dis)utility parameter associated with travel time variability and perceptual conditioning.  
 
A specific comment is required on how we interpret risk attitude in the current study, given that the 
data is a single cross-section, albeit with a data twist. The justification for including risk attitude 
(more commonly used in repeated experiments) is reflected in the repeat nature of travel time which 
engenders a meaning in terms of how the commuter treats travel time each time they undertake a trip. 
This is different to how they perceive the levels of travel time (i.e. the perceptual conditioning and 
believability arguments) associated with each commuting trip. Thus, some commuters  who are risk 
taking are more prepared, ceteris paribus, to accept large variability in travel time; in contrast a risk 
averse person likes greater ‘certainty’ of travel times.  
10 There are a number of alternative weighting functions, e.g., a two-parameter weighing function proposed by 
Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) and another version of a one-parameter weighting function derived by Prelec 
(1998). See Hensher et al. (2011) where all functional forms are implemented. 
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There are also a number of other variables (S) in the utility expression that are not specified this way, 
such as travel cost11 and age of respondent, and are added in as linear in parameters. The presence of 
α, γ  and θ in equations (5) and (6) results in an embedded attribute-specific treatment in the overall 
utility expression associated with each alternative, that is non-linear in a number of parameters. Only 
if (1 )α−  = 1, θ=1, and γ =1 does equation (6) collapse to a linear utility function. Estimation of this 
model requires a non-linear logit form. 
 
Constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) are two 
main options for analysing the attitude towards risk, where the CARA model form postulates 
an exponential specification for the utility function, and the CRRA form is a power 
specification (e.g., U xα= ). For the non-linear utility specification, the CRRA form rather 
than CARA is used in this study, given that CARA is usually a less plausible description of the 
attitude towards risk than CRRA (see Blanchard and Fischer 1989). Blanchard and Fischer (1989, 
p.44) further explained that “the CARA specification is, however, sometimes analytically more 
convenient than the CRRA specification, and thus also belongs to the standard tool kit”. CRRA has 
been widely used in behavioural economics and psychology (see e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1992; 
Holt and Laury 2002; Harrison and Rutström 2009) and often delivers “a better fit than alternative 
families” (Wakker 2008, p.1329). We estimate the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) model form 
as a general power specification (i.e., 1 /(1 )U x α α−= − ), more widely used than the simple xα form 
(Andersen et al. 2009; Holt and Laury 2002). 
7.2 Findings 
 
We investigated both multinomial logit (MNL) and mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) where the latter 
model allows for random parameters. We were unable to establish any statistically significant 
standard deviation parameters for the parameters tested (i.e., α, γ, θ and β associated with travel time). 
The MNL model is nonlinear in many parameters, and as a binary choice model we have no concern 
about the IIA assumption; furthermore there is only one (revealed preference) choice set per 
respondent and so correlated choice sets under typical stated choice experiments is not an issue. 
 
The final results are summarised in Table 4. We present three models: a simple linear model in which 
travel time is probability weighted by the occurrence of each of the three subjective travel times 
(model 1, and Figure 6); two non-linear models in which we account for perceptual conditioning and 
risk attitude in the presence (θ≠1) (model 3) or absence of source preference (θ=1) (model 2, i.e., the 
decision-making context is treated as under risk). The overall goodness of fit of Model 3 is just 
statistically better than model 2 on a chi-square test. The pseudo-R2 for all models is in the often 
supported ‘acceptable range’ between 0.2 and 0.4 for non-linear choice models. 
 
The three parameters of most interest are α, γ, and θ.  In model 3, Given the null=1 for γ and θ, the t-
statistic for the hypothesis that γ=1 is (1.308-1)/0.6708=0.459, and for θ =1 it is (0.857-1)/0.416 = 
0.344. These estimates have to be converted into p-values. For γ, the two-tailed test P value =0.6463, 
which is not statistically significant by conventional criteria; for θ the two-tailed test P value =0.7311, 
also not statistically significant. The null hypothesis for α is 0 (noting the form of the model in 
equation 6), and it is statistically significant from zero. In model 2, the t-statistic for the hypothesis 
that gamma=1 is (0.986-1)/0.109=-0.128, and the two-tailed test P value =0.353, also not statistically 
11 We investigated a similar treatment of cost as given to time but the linear form was the best statistically 
significant effect. 
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significant by conventional criteria. For this one data set we can conclude that the perceptual 
conditioning and the source preference to allow for uncertainty are not statistically significant 
influences and that a behaviourally simple model form (essentially model 1 possibly with the addition 
of α) is an appropriate representation of the role of travel time variability. Despite this empirical 
finding, it is informative to illustrate that role that the additional terms might play, had they been 
statistically significant, given the null, offering a guide to other researchers on the approach they 
might implement with other data sets. 
 
The estimated source preference parameter of 0.857, if statistically significant, would suggest the 
presence of uncertainty aversion given that θ>0 is inversely related to the attractiveness of uncertainty 
source. 1θ ≠ reveals the different source between risk (given probabilities) and uncertainty 
(subjective probabilities). Although we are unable to identify a systematic source preference effect 
given our data, instead relying on theoretical and behavioural arguments offered in psychology (in 
particular the contribution of Fox and Tversky (1998) ) we are able to recognise that if θ=1 then the 
source if of no consequence. 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Summary of Models 
  Probability weighted 
time (Model 1) 
Without source 
preference (Model 2) 
With source preference 
(Model 3) 
Car constant -1.538 (-4.87) -1.699 (-5.15) -1.717 (-5.19) 
Travel time (β) -0.046 (-6.48) -1.629 (1.93) -2.305 (-1.99) 
Travel cost  -0.329 (-9.27) -0.321 (12.6) -0.319 (-12.4) 
Gamma (γ) - 0.986 (9.04) 1.308 (1.95) 
Alpha (α) - 0.979 (6.25) 1.083 (6.57) 
Source preference (θ) - 1.0 (fixed) 0.857 (2.06) 
Age (years) - car 0.014 (1.92) 0.015 (1.76) 0.015 (1.77) 
Log-likelihood:   
At zero -434.6 -434.6 -434.6 
At convergence -279.4 -269.8 -267.8 
Pseudo R2 0.357 0.379 0.384 
AIC 0.904 0.880 0.877 
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Figure 6: Travel time profile of sample 
 
The empirical perceptual conditioning weighting expression (pwpm) under source preference for 
model 3 is: 
 
pwpm=((pm^1.30813)/((pm^1.30813 + (1- pm)^1.30813))^(1/1.30813))^0.85717 ; m=1,2,3 
 
The distribution of pwpm, m=1,2,3 is given in Figure 7 for the sample. The three possible travel 
outcomes are the longest travel time, the shortest travel time and the most likely travel time. The 
respective mean occurrences are 0.434, 0.285 and 0.288. 
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Figure 7: Perceptual conditioning with source preference profile of sample 
 
In Figure 8, we have plotted the shape of the perceptual conditioning function for a given gamma as 
the probability varies. The line defined by γ=1 and θ=1 is a 45 degree line, which is a perfect mapping 
of the decision weights and subjective probabilities.  
 
The estimated values of γ and θ impact (direct and indirect) on the shape of the weighting function. 
Specifically, in standard prospect-theoretic form gamma is the determining estimate and it drives the 
shape; however in the model herein the relevant function is also influenced by the presence (model 3) 
and absence (model 2) of the additional term which is more like a shift parameter than a shape 
parameter. The presence of source preference results in an adjusted influence of the role of gamma 
and hence the differences in the graph. Figure 8 shows that when source preference is accounted for 
(model 3), outcomes with lower probabilities tend to be under-weighted (e.g., w(p = 0.2) = 0.135), 
while outcomes with high probabilities tend to be over-weighted (e.g., w(p = 0.8) = 0.84)12. When 
source preference is not accounted for (model 2), we see the opposite effect; namely outcomes with 
lower probabilities tend to be over-weighted (e.g., w(p = 0.2) = 0.23), while outcomes with high 
probabilities tend to be under-weighted (e.g., w(p = 0.8) = 0.756). The evidence under source 
preference is consistent with a view that at low probabilities there is a tendency for the perceptual 
conditioning to be reduced down; in contrast at high probabilities there is a tendency for perceptual 
conditioning to be increased.  
 
 
12  As shown and discussed in Hensher et al. (2011), the direction of over and under-weighting is not 
behaviourally fixed. There is evidence of gamma being less than and greater than 1.0 and hence there are no 
fixed rules despite some behavioural expectations. Furthermore, much of the prospect theoretic evidence is 
based on financial gambles, which we would argue is different to perceptions of travel times, and trips times that 
occur less often can be overweighted if they were extremely bad experiences (e.g., very bad congestion). 
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Figure 8: Relationship between Non-linear probability weighting functions model 2 and 3 
 
The marginal (dis)utility of the travel time expression for model 3 is:13  
 
MUtime=-2.30508*(pwp1*(time1^(-1.08344))+pwp2*(time2^(-1.08344))+pwp3*(time3^(-1.08344))) 
 
The risk attitude parameter α is statistically significant in both models 2 and 3, respectively 0.979 (t-
value=6.25) and 1.083 (t-value=6.57). For decision making where risk is associated with travel time, a 
risk attitude parameter less than one (as shown under the absence of source preference) suggests risk-
taking attitudes; and a risk attitude parameter greater than one (in the presence of source preference) 
suggests risk-averse attitudes (Senna 1994). 
 
Given the marginal (dis)utility of cost, we can derive the value of expected travel time savings 
(VETTS). VETTS (see Hensher et al. 2011) takes into account the levels of travel time on repeated 
occasions for the commuting trip and hence also allow for travel time variability. The mean VETTS 
for each of the three models 1-3 are respectively, $8.37, $12.80, and $13.49 per person hour. The 
standard deviation VETTS for models 2 and 3, respectively, are $10.04 and $12.12 per person hour.  
 
The model allowing for source preference (model 3) has a higher mean VETTS (5.39 percent greater) 
compared to model 2 which assumes source preference neutrality; however given the standard 
deviations, we cannot conclude statistically (for this one data set) that source preference matters, even 
though use of the mean estimate, common in project appraisal, makes a significant difference in time 
benefits. 
 
We have graphed VETTS from model 3 in Figure 9, which shows that the majority of values are 
between $5 and $30 per person hour. There are clearly some commuters who place a very high value 
on reducing expected travel time (i.e. reducing trip time variability). For example, if we take a high 
value of, say, $60 per person hour, given the sample of commuters whose gross personal income 
varies from $10,000 to $260,000 per annum, then given average income earning hours of 2,000 per 
13 See Table 4 for equivalent parameters for model 2. 
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annum, some individuals earn up to $130 per hour. Also, in Sydney, it is not uncommon on the toll 
road network to pay $12-$15 for a one-way commuting trip in order to save 20 mins, equivalent on 
average to $36-$45 per hour. The distribution of VETTS is more than the distribution of the value of 
travel time savings, allowing for the value of trip time variability reduction, and is arguably within a 
plausible behavioural range. 
 
 
Figure 9: VETTS distribution for Model 3 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
Maximum Expected Utility theory proposed by Noland and Small (1995) is the foundation of many 
contemporary travel time reliability studies. However, some limitations are present that need 
addressing. First, travel time variability has been treated as risk in a number of stated choice 
experiments, in which the probabilities of different travel scenarios were clearly defined and 
exogenously induced to respondents (objective probabilities). According to psychological theories, 
decision making in the presence of travel time variability is made under uncertainty rather than under 
risk; consequently this raises questions about the usefulness of choice experiments given that they 
predefine attribute levels and the likelihood of occurrence. In this paper we suggest a return to a 
revealed preference setting in order to identify subjective (or judged) levels of attributes including 
their occurrence probability when a specific attribute’s level is subject to uncertainty under a repeated 
activity situation as is commuting.  
 
To account for the variability in attribute levels associated with a specific choice such as the car for 
the commuting trip, a number of transportation studies have used alternative behavioural paradigms 
(e.g., expected utility theory, rank dependent utility theory, and prospect theory) in which decision 
weights are measures of perceptual conditioning in respect to the occurrence of varying attribute 
levels. Although these models are capable of analysing decision making under risk, they cannot fully 
explain decision making under uncertainty. The Ellsberg paradox indicates that source preference 
must be addressed for uncertain events, which requires a further transformation over risky probability 
weighting. In this paper we have reviewed the contributions in psychology on source preference, and 
presented a parametric way forward to addressing attitude towards uncertainty (constant relative 
uncertainty aversion), and the identification of source preference.  
 
Using a newly collected data set on commuting travel that provided data on subjective travel times 
and associated subjective occurrence probabilities, we estimated the source preference parameter, and 
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although it is not statistically significant on our single data set, the approach is sufficiently 
informative to illustrate the role that source preference might play on model performance (especially 
estimates of mean values of expected travel time savings) relative to a model assuming neutral source 
preference.  
 
The process of subjective judgment of probabilities of occurrence incurs additional disutility captured 
as uncertainty aversion (θ>0). Deviations of the source preference parameter (θ), from 1.0 is a 
measure of the uncertainty-risk gap in decision making. Although in this single data set study, the 
deviation between the value of expected travel time savings distribution under source preference vs. 
risk is small, and statistically non-significant, this does not detract from the value of recognising the 
potential influence of sources of influence on uncertainty that are related to subjective measures of 
occurrence that cannot be accommodated in stated choice experiments. This suggests a more serious 
rethink about the role of revealed preference data which, if properly constructed as in this paper, can 
produce the necessary variability in attribute levels to circumvent the possible need for a choice 
experiment.  
 
Bonsall (2004) argued that most travel behaviour studies have a rather simple treatment of uncertainty 
(i.e., as a purely statistical issue), and highlighted the importance of accommodating psychological 
aspects of response to uncertainty in travel behaviour research “since it is uncertainty in the mind of 
the traveller, rather than variability in the system, which directly influences behaviour, [and hence] we 
need to understand people’s perception of [uncertainty] and attitudes to uncertainty if we are to 
predict their responses to it” (p.45). This paper echoes Bonsall’s position, supporting further research 
on the influence of uncertainty in travel decision making from both behavioural and psychological 
perspectives.  
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